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CASENOTES
CIVIL PROCEDURE:

RESTRICTION ON THE TRIAL COURT'S

DISCRETION IN RULING ON RULE 55(C) AND

60(b)

MOTIONS TO

VACATE DEFAULT ENTRIES AND JUDGMENTS-United Coin Meter

Co. v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 705 F.2d 839 (6th Cir. 1983).
I.

INTRODUCTION

It is a settled principle of Anglo-American jurisprudence that
judgments should be final. It is equally settled that judgments need be
rendered without sacrifice of an individual's paramount right to defend
on the merits. A federal district court judge confronted with a rule
55(c)' or 60(b)" motion to set aside a default or default judgment balances the competing values of judicial efficiency and individual justice.3
In theory, this "disposition of motions made under rules 55(c) and
60(b) is a matter which lies largely within the discretion of the trial
judge ' 4 and the trial judge's determination should not be reversed on
appeal absent an abuse of discretion. In reality, however, the courts of
I. FED. R. Civ. P. 55(c) provides that "[fior good cause shown the court may set aside an
entry of default and, if a judgment by default has been entered, may likewise set it aside in
accordance with Rule 60(b)."
2. The relevant portion of FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) provides that
[oin motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1)
mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which
by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule
59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation,
or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is based has been
reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment should have
prospective application; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2),
and (3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or
taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) does not affect the finality of a judgment or
suspend its operation ...
This note will only deal with FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(l). Although the defaulter in this case
argued rule 60(b)(2) grounds for relief in addition to rule 60(b)(l) grounds, neither the district
court nor the court of appeals dealt with this argument. United Coin Meter Co. v. Seaboard
Coastline R.R., 705 F.2d 839, 843 (6th Cir. 1983).
3. il C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2851, at 140
(1973).
4. Consolidated Masonry & Fireproofing, Inc. v. Wagman Constr. Corp., 383 F.2d 249, 251
(4th Cir. 1967).
5. 10 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2693, at
472-74 (2d ed. 1983).
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appeals have not been reluctant to find abuses of discretion.6
This note will focus upon the recent Sixth Circuit Court of Ap7
peals decision in United Coin Meter Co. v. Seaboard Coastline R.R.
In Coin Meter, the court of appeals held that the district court had
abused its discretion in denying Seaboard's motions to set aside the
default entry and judgment entered against it.' The court enunciated
three criteria for the district courts to consider in the exercise of their
discretion on rule 60(b) motions: "1. Whether the plaintiff will be
prejudiced; 2. Whether the defendant has a meritorious defense; and 3.
Whether culpable conduct of the defendant led to the default." 9 The
court found an abuse of discretion because the district court had not
considered these three factors. 10 Strongly emphasizing the need for a
liberal, equitable construction of rules 55(c) and 60(b), the Coin Meter
court left no doubt of the Sixth Circuit's disfavor of default
judgments.11
This note will also examine the procedure contemplated by rules
55 and 60 in juxtaposition with the procedures followed by the Coin
Meter court. 2 A review of some previous Sixth Circuit cases dealing
with rules 55(c) and 60(b)" s and a survey of the treatment of these
rules in the other federal circuits" will also be provided by way of
background. The analysis of the rationale behind the Coin Meter decision will focus upon the three factors considered by the court as dispositive of rule 55(c) and 60(b) motions to vacate,"6 and will include a
brief discussion of the opposing policies involved in these cases' 6 and
the informal practices followed by both parties in the lower court in
this case.' 7
II.

FACTS AND HOLDING

On December 12, 1980, Coin Meter filed a complaint against Seaboard Coastline Railroad alleging that Seaboard had damaged its prop-

erty in the process of transporting it from New York to Florida. On
February 17, 1981, Seaboard moved to dismiss Coin Meter's com-

6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

Id. at 475-76.
705 F.2d 839 (6th Cir. 1983).
705 F.2d at 839.
Id. at 845 (quoting Feliciano v. Reliant Tooling Co., 691 F.2d 653, 656 (3d Cir. 1982)).
Id. at 846.
Id. at 844-45.
See infra section III(A).
See infra section 111(B).
See infra section 111(C).
See infra section IV(A).
See infra section IV(B).
See infra section IV(C).
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plaint, contending that the plaintiff's property was damaged by a third
party employed by the plaintiff to move the property from the defendant's train. Coin Meter thereupon denied having employed any third
party to move its property."8
The hearing on the motion for dismissal was postponed several
times and the defendant subsequently withdrew the motion. A docket
entry on May 5, 1981, noted the withdrawal of the motion to dismiss;
the defendant Seaboard had not, however, filed any written motion to
withdraw the motion to dismiss nor had the court entered an order permitting the withdrawal. 19
On May 19, 1981, the plaintiff Coin Meter Company filed a request for entry of default, claiming that "[d]efendant had failed and
neglected to file an [a]nswer or take any other affirmative action as
prescribed by law.' 0 The clerk entered default on that day and on
May 26, 1981, the plaintiff filed a motion for entry of a default judgment. The court set the hearing for June 30, 1981.21 Seaboard then
filed its opposition to the default entry, contending that the plaintiff's
attorney had granted the defendant "a period of 20 days from the hearing date on the motion to dismiss within which to file a response to the
'2
complaint."
At the hearing on the motion for default judgment, the plaintiff's
attorney claimed that the judge's law clerk had informed him that the
twenty days were to run from April 28, 198 1.21 After both sides argued
the merits of the case, the district court denied the defendant's motion
to set aside the default entry, finding neither excusable neglect nor a
meritorious defense.' Also at the hearing, Coin Meter presented evidence establishing damages and a witness who testified that the plaintiff had not employed any third party to move its property from Seaboard's train. Seaboard "requested a continuance to obtain testimony"
but the court granted Coin Meter's motion for entry of default judgment.' Subsequently, Seaboard filed a motion for reconsideration and

18. 705 F.2d at 840.
19. Id. at 841. As the court of appeals noted, "[tihe oral withdrawal of a written motion to
dismiss is a procedure unknown to this court. Rule 7(b), F.R. Civ. P., requires motions to be made
in writing unless made during a hearing or a trial." 705 F.2d at 843. The parties agreed that the
motion was withdrawn but they disagreed as to the date of withdrawal. The court of appeals
concluded that "the official record of the case should control" and the record supported Seaboard's contention that the motion was withdrawn on May 5, 1981. Id.
20. Id. at 841.

21.

Id.

22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. The defaulter did not file a formal motion to set aside the default entry. Id. at 844.
Id. at 841.
Id. at' 841-42.
Id. at 842. The district court's ruling was oral. Id.
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answered the plaintiff's complaint. At the hearing on this motion,
Seaboard filed a motion to set aside the default judgment. The district
court ruled in the plaintiff's favor on both motions. 6
On appeal, the circuit court reversed the judgment of the district
court, holding that the district court had abused its discretion in denying the defendant's motion to set aside the entry of default and default
judgment.2 The court of appeals found an abuse of discretion because
"the district court did not discuss prejudice or willfulness and applied
an erroneous standard in concluding that no meritorious defense had
been presented. 2 8
III.
A.

BACKGROUND

Procedural Steps Entailed in Rules 55 and 60

Default entries and judgments were designed to promote the expeditious conduct of litigation:2 9 the default judgment is in fact the ultimate weapon for the promotion of compliance with the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. 0 However, the effect of default is not always ultimate. Rules 55(c) and 60(b) furnish the means whereby a defaulter
may obtain relief from a default entry or judgment. Rules 55 and 60
were meant solely to define the procedures a party should follow in
entering and setting aside defaults and default judgments,"' procedures
the court of appeals set out as follows:
The procedural steps contemplated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure following a defendant's failure to plead or defend as required by the
Rules begin with the entry of a default by the clerk upon a plaintiff's
request. Rule 55(a). Then, pursuant to Rule 55(c), the defendant has an
opportunity to seek to have the default set aside. If that motion is not
made or is unsuccessful, and if no hearing is needed to ascertain damages, judgment by default may be entered by the court or, if the defendant has not appeared, by the clerk. Rule 55(b). Finally, Rule 55(c)
authorizes a motion to set aside a default judgment pursuant to Rule
60(b).$2
After this exposition of procedure, the Coin Meter court proceeded
to condone Seaboard's failure to follow this procedure. Specifically,

26.
27.
28.

Id.
Id. at 843, 846.
Id. at 846.
29. 10 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 5, § 2693, at 477-80.
30. Id. § 2693, at 477-78.
31. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) advisory committee note. The committee stated that the rule was
not meant to define the substantive grounds for relief. Id.
32. 705 F.2d at 844 (quoting Meehan v. Snow, 652 F.2d 274, 276 (2d Cir. 1981)).
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Seaboard had never made a motion to set aside the default entry. 3
Although most courts require a party to file a formal motion to set
aside the default, 4 the Coin Meter court took the position that "an
answer or other opposition to a motion for default may be treated as a
motion to set aside entry of default."3 5 Although this proposition is directly supported by a prominent commentator, 6 the expedience of this

proposition is questionable.
B.

Previous Sixth Circuit Cases

In Golden v. National Finance Adjusters,3 7 a trial court in the
same district as the Coin Meter court considered the same three factors
for setting aside a default entry as did the court of appeals in Coin

Meter.38 The trial judge in Golden held these factors appropriate for
the disposition of a rule 55(c) motion, 9 while the trial judge in Coin
Meter held that the default in that case should not be set aside because

there was no proof of excusable neglect and no facts establishing a
meritorious defense. 40 The court of appeals in Coin Meter made no

mention of Golden in its opinion.
A very early Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals decision, Rooks v.
American Brass Co., exhibited a preference for trial on the merits similar to that of the court in Coin Meter.41 The Coin Meter court quoted

some language from Rooks in support of its liberal approach to rule
60(b) motions.42 Although the Rooks court explicitly considered only

33. 705 F.2d at 841, 844. On June 30, 1981, Seaboard merely filed its opposition to the
default. Id. at 841.
34. 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 3, § 2865, at 226. See. e.g., Gray v. John
Jovino Co., 84 F.R.D. 46, 47 (E.D. Tenn. 1979).
35. 705 F.2d at 844. The court in Coin Meter cited two recent decisions as authority for
this proposition. The first decision generously construed a motion for a directed verdict as the
equivalent of a rule 60(b) motion. Breuer Elec. Mfg. Co. v. Toronado Sys. of Am., 687 F.2d 182,
186 (7th Cir. 1982). The other court stated that since a default had not been formally entered by
the court, there was no basis for criticizing the defendant for failing to file a motion to set aside
the default. Meehan, 652 F.2d at 276. The court in Meehan did state, in dicta, that even if the
court had formally entered the default, it still would have allowed the appeal. Id.
36. Although Rule 55(c) envisions a formal motion for relief, the courts have shown
considerable leniency in treating other procedural steps as equivalent to a motion, particularly when the conduct evidences a desire to correct the default. Illustratively, the federal
courts quite naturally often view opposition to a motion for the entry of a default judgment
as a motion for setting aside the default, whether or not a formal motion under Rule 55(c)
has been made ....
10 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 5, § 2692, at 466-67 (footnote omitted).
37. 555 F. Supp. 42 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
38. Compare 705 F.2d at 844 with 555 F. Supp. at 44.
39. 555 F. Supp. at 42.
40. 705 F.2d at 842.
41. 263 F.2d 166, 169 (6th Cir. 1959).
42. 705 F.2d at 846.
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two factors in its decision to set aside the default judgment,4 8 the court
also considered it relevant that "no intervening rights [had] attached."" This is analogous to the Coin Meter court's analysis of the
possibility of prejudice to the nondefaulting party."' In addition, the
Coin Meter court applied the Rooks court's meritorious defense standard virtually intact. 4" For all practical purposes, the Coin Meter
court's articulation of the three factors required to be considered in the
disposition of rule 55(c) or 60(b) motions is not fundamentally different from the Rooks articulation. 47
C.

Comparison with the Other Federal Circuits

Every federal circuit court of appeals except the Eleventh Circuit
has recognized that abuse of discretion is the proper standard of review
for district court decisions on rule 55(c) and 60(b) motions.' 8 Disposition of these motions rests within the sound discretion of the trial court
judge because he or she is "in the best position to evaluate the good
faith and credibility of the parties.' 4 Nevertheless, there are many
cases where, as in Coin Meter, the courts of appeals have found abuses
of discretion.
Those courts which have found an abuse of discretion are usually
predisposed toward a trial on the merits as was the Coin Meter court.
In these circuits, the courts have required a liberal construction of rules
55(c) and 60(b) when dealing with default entries and judgments.50

43. The court in Rooks considered whether the defaulter had demonstrated the existence of
rule 60(b)(1) grounds for relief and whether the defaulter had shown a meritorious defense. 263
F.2d at 168-69.
44. Id. at 168.
45. 705 F.2d at 845.
46. "[I]f any defense relied upon states a defense good at law, then a meritorious defense
has been advanced." Id.
47. However, the Coin Meter court underscored its preference for trial upon the merits
much more emphatically than did the Rooks court.
48. 705 F.2d at 843; Kansas City Bricklayers Employees Pension Fund v. Kelly Waterproofing, Inc., 646 F.2d 338, 339 (8th Cir. 1981); Seven Elves, Inc. v. Eskenazi, 635 F.2d 396,
402 (5th Cir. 1981); Keegel v. Key West & Caribbean Trading Co., 627 F.2d 372, 373-75 (D.C.
Cir. 1980); In re Stone, 588 F.2d 1316, 1321 (10th Cir. 1978); Ben Sager Chems. Int'l v. E.
Targosz & Co., 560 F.2d 805, 809 (7th Cir. 1977); Medunic v. Lederer, 533 F.2d 891, 892-93
(3d Cir. 1976); Greenspun v. Bogan, 492 F.2d 375, 377 (1st Cir. 1974); United States v. Erdoss,
440 F.2d 1221, 1223 (2d Cir.), cert. denied. 404 U.S. 849 (1971); Madsen v. Bumb, 419 F.2d 4, 6
(9th Cir. 1969); Tolson v. Hedge, 411 F.2d 123, 130 (4th Cir. 1969). Although the Eleventh

Circuit has not explicitly stated that abuse of discretion is the standird of review, the court in
Hall v. Alabama, 700 F.2d 1333 (11th Cir. 1983), recognized that it is within a district court's
discretion whether or not to vacate a judgment. Id. at 1338.
49. 10 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 5, § 2693, at 475.
50. 705 F.2d at 845; SEC v. Seaboard Corp., 666 F.2d 414, 417 (9th Cir. 1982); Ellingsworth v. Chrysler, 665 F.2d 180, 185 (7th Cir. 1981); 652 F.2d at 277; 635 F.2d at 403; In re
Stone, 588 F.2d at 1322; 533 F.2d at 893-94; 492 F.2d at 382; Pulliam v. Pulliam, 478 F.2d 935,
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Although the Eighth and Eleventh Circuits have not adopted liberal
constructions of these rules, a district court in the Eleventh Circuit
stated that the benefit of the doubt on a rule 55(c) motion should be
given to the movant in order to secure a trial on the merits." In Assmann v. Fleming, the Eighth Circuit recognized that these rules "must
be administered upon equitable principles. 6 52 More recently, however,
in Kansas City Bricklayers Employees Pension Fund v. Kelly Waterproofing, Inc.," the Eighth Circuit stated that rule 60(b) relief may be
granted "only upon an adequate showing of exceptional circumstances."' " According to one court, an equitable and liberal construction of these rules is mandated by the language of rule 1 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure,6 5 which states that the Rules "shall be construed to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every
action."68
Although most of the federal circuits liberally construe the motions to set aside default entries or judgments, there has been a divergence in the factors which the circuits consider dispositive in ruling on
these motions. As the court in Rasmussen stated, "[b]ecause discretion
is involved in determining whether good cause exists, the Court cannot
rely upon a mechanical rule of general application." 51 Nonetheless, several circuits' courts of appeals do rely upon the same three-factor
mechanical test that Coin Meter utilized. 58 The other circuits have utilized a variety of approaches to rule 55(c) and 60(b) motions to set

936 (D.C. Cir. 1973); 411 F.2d at 130. See 10 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 5,
§ 2694, at 494; 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 3, § 2852, at 143.
51. Rasmussen v. W.E. Hutton & Co., 68 F.R.D. 231, 233 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
52. 159 F.2d 332, 336 (8th Cir. 1947).
53. 646 F.2d 338 (8th Cir. 1981).
54. Id. at 339. One commentator has noted that courts which have required "a showing of
exceptional circumstances" for motions under clauses one through five of rule 60(b) have misinterpreted the Supreme Court's decision in Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601 (1949). Wham,
Federal District Court Rule 60(b): A Humane Rule Gone Wrong, 49 A.B.A. J. 566, 567 (1963).
As Wham points out, the Court in Klapprott merely held that a defaulter must make "a showing
of exceptional circumstances" in a motion under the sixth clause of rule 60(b) for "any other
reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment." Id. at 567.
55. Davis v. Parkhill-Goodloe Co., 302 F.2d 489, 495 (5th Cir. 1962).
56. FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
57. 68 F.R.D. at 233.
58. Farnese v. Bagnasco, 687 F.2d 761, 764 (3d Cir. 1982); 652 F.2d at 277; 627 F.2d at
373. In Madsen, 419 F.2d at 6-7, the court considered "the additional cost and delay resulting
from a reopening of the action" in addition to considerations of the willfulness of the default and
whether the defaulter had shown a meritorious defense. The cost and delay considerations are
merely measures of prejudice to the nondefaulter. In Tolson, 411 F.2d at 130, the court considered the "shortness of delay" and the "absence of gross neglect" instead of the willfulness of the
default and prejudice to the nondefaulter. A district court in the Eleventh Circuit also considered
the three Coin Meter criteria immediately after stating that a mechanical rule cannot be relied
upon. 68 F.R.D. at 233.
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aside default entries and judgments. The Fifth Circuit considered a
long list of factors in setting aside a default judgment in Seven Elves,
Inc. v. Eskenazi, including the meritorious defense requirement and
prejudice to the nondefaulting party.59 In the Seventh and Tenth Circuits, the courts of appeals will set aside default entries or judgments if
the defaulter can show a good reason or excuse for the default and a
meritorious defense.60 In the Eighth Circuit, the court of appeals has
no consistent manner of dealing with rule 55(c) or 60(b) motions and
often requires a "showing of exceptional circumstances."6 Although in
theory the disposition of a rule 55(c) or 60(b) motion is within the
discretion of the trial judge, this discretion is severely limited in those
circuits which have determined that certain criteria must be considered
by the trial court."

IV.
A.

ANALYSIS

The Three Criteria Adopted by the Coin Meter Court

The Coin Meter court stated that there are three criteria which a
district court should apply in considering a rule 60(b) motion for relief:
"1. Whether the plaintiff will be prejudiced; 2. Whether the defendant
has a meritorious defense; and 3. Whether culpable conduct of the defendant led to the default."6'
The Coin Meter Company did not claim that it would be
prejudiced by reopening the judgment and the court therefore concluded that there was not sufficient prejudice." The justification for
consideration of the prejudice factor was provided by the early case of
Tozer v. Charles A. Krause Milling Co., 65 wherein it was stated that a
court should consider prejudice in ruling on these motions because relief from a default judgment is "essentially equitable in nature." 66 It
should be emphasized that it is extremely rare for a court to deny a

59. 635 F.2d at 402-03.
60. 687 F.2d at 185; Barta v. Long, 670 F.2d 907, 909 (10th Cir. 1982). A district court in
the First Circuit also used these criteria in setting aside a default. Vega Matta v. Alvarez de
Choudens, 440 F. Supp. 246, 248 (D.P.R. 1977), affid mem.. 577 F.2d 722 (1st Cir. 1978).
61. 646 F.2d at 339.
62. For example, the court in Coin Meter found an abuse of discretion because the district
court did not consider all of the three criteria that the court of appeals decided were controlling.
705 F.2d at 846.
63. Id. at 845 (quoting Feliciano v. Reliant Tooling Co., 691 F.2d 653, 656 (3d Cir. 1982)).
64. "Mere delay in satisfying a plaintiff's claim, if it should succeed at trial, is not sufficient
prejudice to require denial of a motion to set aside a default judgment." 705 F.2d at 845. The
court in Gill v. Stolow, 240 F.2d 669, 672 (2d Cir. 1957), stated that in our court system delay is
inevitable in these situations and that delay alone would not establish prejudice.
65. 189 F.2d 242 (3d Cir. 1951).
66. Id. at 246. See also 10 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 5, § 2699, at
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motion for relief on this basis alone because courts have the power to
to prevent any sigimpose conditions upon the vacation of a judgment
67
party.
nondefaulting
the
to
nificant prejudice
It is much more common for a court to deny a motion for relief
from a default entry or default judgment when the defaulter fails to
make an adequate showing of a meritorious defense. 68 Although the
Federal Rules clearly do not mandate the showing of a meritorious defense, the courts have imposed this requirement in the interests of judicial economy. 69 Since the rules do not expressly require a meritorious
will be necessary is
defense, "the nature and extent of the showing that
70
discretion."1
court's
the
within
a matter that lies
In this exercise of discretion, the courts have taken three different
approaches to the meritorious defense requirement.1 Some courts have
required the defaulter to provide the facts supporting the defense."
Other courts have merely required that the defaulter allege a meritorious defense," and, under the most liberal approach, courts have actually searched the pleadings for any indication of a meritorious
defense. 4
A majority of courts have required a defaulter to show a factual
basis for the defense. 8 The district court in Coin Meter followed this
approach.76 By requiring a factual basis for a meritorious defense, a
balance is struck between the competing values of individual justice-achieved through a trial on the merits-and judicial economy."
The court of appeals in Coin Meter, however, required that the defaulter need merely allege a meritorious defense. The Coin Meter court
found that Seaboard's contention that the damage occurred to the

67.

10 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 5, § 2699, at 534, 536. Rule 60(b)

provides that a court should grant these motions "upon such terms as are just." FED. R. Civ. P.
60(b). For example, in Barber v. Turberville, 218 F.2d 34 (D.C. Cir. 1954), the defaulter had to
pay the costs that the other party incurred upon appeal. Id. at 36.
68. See, e.g., Wokan v. Alladin Int'l, Inc., 485 F.2d 1232, 1234 (3d Cir. 1973) (default

judgment); Tri-Continental Leasing Corp. v. Zimmerman, 485 F. Supp. 495, 501 (N.D. Cal.
1980) (default entry).
69. 10 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 5, § 2697, at 531. There would be
no need to reopen a case unless the defaulter could show that the outcome would be different in a
trial on the merits. Id. at 525.
70. Id. at 531.
71. Trueblood v. Grayson Shops, 32 F.R.D. 190, 196 (E.D. Va. 1963); see 10 C. WRIGHT,
A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 5, § 2697, at 528-31.
72. See, e.g., Gomes v. Williams, 420 F.2d 1364, 1366 (10th Cit. 1970).
73. See, e.g., 705 F.2d at 844, 845.
74. See, e.g., 411 F.2d at 130.
75. 10 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 5, § 2697, at 529.
76. 705 F.2d at 842.
77. See 420 F.2d at 1366; 485 F. Supp. at 497; Project, Relief from Default Judgments
under Rule 60(b)-A Study of Federal Case Law, 49 FORDHAM L. REv. 956, 997-1005 (1981).
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plaintiff's property after Seaboard had completed delivery represented
a meritorious defense to the action. 8 The Coin Meter court concluded
that the district court "applied an erroneous standard in concluding
that no meritorious defense had been presented." 7" By requiring little
more than an allegation of a defense, Coin Meter has clearly tipped the
balance in favor of individual justice, limiting the district court's discretion as to the "nature and extent" of the required showing. 0
The third criterion applied in Coin Meter was the measure of the
willfulness of Seaboard's default.81 This factor was not judicially created. A defaulter who can show that default was not willful has usually
shown the existence of rule 60(b)(1) grounds for relief.82
The Coin Meter court decided that the default was not the result
of willful (culpable) conduct on the part of Seaboard. The trial court
record supported Seaboard counsel's belief that she had twenty days
from May 5, 1981 in which to answer the plaintiff's complaint. There
was nothing in the official record to support Coin Meter's contention
that April 28 was the date from which the twenty days to answer
should run. The court of appeals accepted Seaboard counsel's explanation that she misunderstood the agreement with Coin Meter and as a
result she inadvertently failed to answer before Coin Meter filed for
default.83
B. Policy Considerations.
During the Coin Meter court's consideration of these three factors,
the court should have been concerned with the competing goals of the
federal courts: expediting litigation and achieving substantial justice
through a trial upon the merits." As one court has articulated this proposition, "[tihe preferred disposition of any case is upon its merits and
not by default judgment. However, this judicial preference is counterbalanced by considerations of social goals, justice and expediency, a
weighing process which lies largely within the domain of the trial
78.

705 F.2d at 845.

79. Id. at 846.
80. According to one commentator, "[b]y its very nature, the question whether to require a
showing of a meritorious defense, as well as the type of demonstration required, must be determined on a case by case basis and with an awareness of the policies behind default judgments and
the circumstances under which they should be set aside." 10 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE,
supra note 5, § 2697, at 531-32. Assuming that this commentator is correct, the Coin Meter
approach to the meritorious defense requirement may be ill-advised in that it promotes judicial
inefficiency and removes a major component of the trial court's discretion.
81. 705 F.2d at 845.
82. Rule 60(b)(I) grounds are "mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect." FED.
R. Civ. P. 60(b)(l).
83. 705 F.2d at 845.
84. See 10 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 5, § 2693. at 477-80.
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judge's discretion."8 The Coin Meter court, however, does not expressly consider any of these countervailing policies in its opinion, effectively removing this balancing process from the trial judge's domain.
As the court in Coin Meter states, "Trials on the merits are favored in
federal courts and a 'glaring abuse' of discretion is not required for
reversal of a court's refusal to relieve a party of the harsh sanction of
default." 86 The implication of this decision for the district courts in the
Sixth Circuit is that trial judges will be found to have abused what
little discretion the court of appeals has left them unless the benefit of
any doubt is given to the defaulting party. 7
As previously mentioned, some courts have interpreted rule 1 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as mandating this extremely liberal and equitable approach to rule 55(c) and 60(b) motions to vacate
default entries and judgments." Although this approach may be justified for default entries, it seems too lenient when there is a final judgment at stake-even if only a default judgment. Defaults and default
judgments clearly "play an important role in the maintenance of an
orderly, efficient judicial system."" The Coin Meter court's evident antagonism toward default entries and judgments could signal a reduction
in importance of both in the future in the Sixth Circuit."
C. Informal Procedures in the Lower Court.
The court of appeals in Coin Meter devoted a substantial portion
of its opinion to a discussion of the "sloppy practice" of the attorneys
for both parties and their failure to keep the court informed of their
actions. 9 ' In fact, the amount of attention devoted to these informalities
may serve to neutralize some of the decision's precedential effect. The
excessive informality present in the lower court could provide a means
for courts to distinguish the facts of Coin Meter and avoid this liberal
approach to setting aside default judgments.
To a large degree, the Coin Meter court's decision to set aside the
default judgment hinged on the fact that the record supported Seaboard's version of the facts; as an appellate court, the justices were

85.

420 F.2d at 1366 (citation and footnotes omitted).

86. 705 F.2d at 846.
87. "Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the petition to set aside the judgment so that
cases may be decided on their merits." Id. (quoting 189 F.2d at 245).
88. See supra text accompanying notes 55-56.
89. 10 C. WRIGHT, A MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 5, § 2693, at 477-78. Mainly, they
serve to enforce compliance with the rules and secure speedy decisions. Id. at 478.
90. However, many other courts have shown a similar dislike for default judgments. Id. at
480. See, e.g., 627 F.2d at 373-74.
91. 705 F.2d at 843, 846.
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case on that basis alone.92 This decision should
warning to attorneys practicing in the Sixth Cirfile formal written motions with the trial court in
type of confusion present in Coin Meter.93 The
no sympathy for the plight of the nondefaulting
as evidenced by the fact that both parties were
own costs on appeal. 94
V.

CONCLUSION

Although the court of appeals' holding in this case is sound and its
criticism of the informal conduct of both parties' attorneys was appropriate, the Coin Meter court may have adopted an overly generous approach to vacating default judgments. The language of the opinion indicates that the court will rarely allow a default judgment to stand.9 5
In many cases, the court's unequivocal preference for trial on the merits may force it to vacate the default judgment. In fact, Coin Meter
disregards the policies which weigh against the setting aside of default
judgments-"finality of judgments and the termination of litigation." 9 1
Coin Meter signals a major restriction of the trial court's discretion in dealing with rule 60(b) motions in the Sixth Circuit. It appears
that unless a trial court explicitly applies the three factors outlined by
the Coin Meter court with all doubts resolved in favor of the defaulter,
the court of appeals will set the default judgment aside. Thus, the utility of default judgments in the Sixth Circuit has been severely reduced.
As the decision indicates, a default judgment will be set aside unless
the defaulter has been guilty of gross neglect and/or cannot produce a
plausible defense to the complaint. Assuming this interpretation of
Coin Meter is accurate, rule 55 may as well be stricken from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in the Sixth Circuit.
David E. Koerner

92. Id. at 846. The record showed that Seaboard's default was far from willful, making it
difficult to conclude that any real prejudice would accrue to Coin Meter if the default judgment
were set aside because Coin Meter filed for an entry of default too soon. Id. at 843.
93. Id. at 846.
94. Id.
95. "Judgment by default is a drastic step which should be resorted to only in the most
extreme cases." Id. at 845.
96. 10 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, supra note 5, § 2693, at 479.
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